

# SPEEDEX

A **S**calable, **P**arallelizable, and **E**conomically **E**fficient  
**D**ecentralized **EX**change

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Stanford University


# Digital Currency Interoperability

- Digital currencies are on the horizon
- Interoperability will be a crucial challenge
  - Anyone should be able to pay anyone seamlessly, regardless of currencies
- Need efficient infrastructure to trade currencies
- Shared infrastructure should be jointly operated, not centrally controlled
  - Replicated state machine with decentralized consensus layer

**Is blockchain a good basis for an asset exchange?**

# Requirements for an Ideal Decentralized Exchange

## Computational Performance




- **No! Not if you look at existing blockchains**
  - Dozens of transactions per second

Current Blockchains on Real Traffic  
(Source: realtps.net)

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


Block-STM [GSXDLM22] on a  
*payments-only* workload

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- **State of the art systems not sufficiently scalable**
  - Even just for payments

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


SPEEDEX on a *payments-only* workload

- **No! Not if you look at existing blockchains**
  - Dozens of transactions per second
- **State of the art systems not sufficiently scalable**
  - Even just for payments
- **SPEEDEX gets linear scalability**
- **Exchange is a much harder problem than just payments**

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


SPEEDEX on a *payments-only* workload

## Economic Performance

- **Efficient Liquidity Usage**
- **Fair, Open Access**

# Orderbooks



Every offer modifies the orderbook  
Every trade can happen at a different price

# Decentralized Exchanges Today

## Bad in Both Categories

### Computational Performance

- Read-Modify-Update on shared data structures
- Worst-case for Optimistic Concurrency Control

### Economic Performance

- Front-Running
  - High-Frequency Trading

Sell @ \$9

Buy @ \$11

- Suboptimal Liquidity, Cyclic Arbitrage
  - (next slide)



# Decentralized Exchanges Today


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
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


- Suboptimal Liquidity, Cyclic Arbitrage
  - (next slide)

# Suboptimal Liquidity and Cyclic Arbitrage



# Suboptimal Liquidity and Cyclic Arbitrage



# SPEEDEX: Batch Trading

- Input: Block of Offers
- 1. Compute Valuations
- 2. Trade with SPEEDEX at Valuation Quotients
  - Meaningless units
  - No pairwise matching!
- “Clearing” if no surplus or debt

Trade 10 USD for EUR  
min  $\frac{9 \text{ EUR}}{10 \text{ USD}}$

Trade 9 EUR for JPY  
min  $140 \frac{\text{JPY}}{\text{EUR}}$

Trade 1350 JPY for USD  
min  $\frac{1 \text{ USD}}{135 \text{ JPY}}$

Trade 10000 USD for EUR  
min  $1000 \frac{\text{EUR}}{\text{USD}}$

SPEEDEX  
Pricing Engine

$$p_{\text{USD}} = 9$$

$$p_{\text{EUR}} = 10$$


$$p_{\text{JPY}} = \frac{1}{15}$$

Theorem (Arrow and Debreu, 1954)

*There always exists a unique\* set of valuations  $\{p_A\}$  that clears the market.*

# SPEEDEX: Batch Trading

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# Why Uniform Clearing Valuations?

## Computational Performance

- **Commutative Trades**
  - Almost entirely hardware atomics
- **Linear Scalability**
  - Scalable Commutativity Rule [CKZMK13]

## Economic Performance

- **No In-Batch Front-Running**
  - No need to hyperoptimize limit prices and network latency
  - Everyone gets the same rates
- **No Cyclic Arbitrage / Optimal Liquidity Usage**
  - No need to specify intermediate assets

# SPEDEX In Context

## Prior Work

- **2-Asset Batch Trading**
  - Response to High-Frequency Trading [BCS15]
  - NYSE Opening/Closing Auction
- **Many-Asset Batch Trading [CoWSwap]**
  - ❌ Unscalable, Low Throughput

## Our Contribution

- 1 Compute Valuations at Scale**
- 2 Feasibility of Many-Asset Batch Trading**
- 3 High-Performance System Design**

# Equilibria Computation

- **2-asset case**
  - Binary search
- **Many-asset case**
  - Find simultaneous intersection point of many high-dimensional manifolds over a high-dimensional simplex





# Fast Equilibria Computation


## Use Market Structure to Simplify Problem

### All Prior Known Algorithms

- **Runtime**  $\text{poly}(\#\text{offers})$

### Our Design

- **Iterative (based on Tâtonnement [CMV05])**
  - Economics 101 Price Adjustment
- **Iteration runtime**  
 $O(\#\text{assets}^2 \lg(\#\text{offers}))$ 
  - Incrementally sort offers by limit price




### Empirical Results

$\sim 100\mu\text{s}$  per iteration,  $\sim 1000$  iterations

# Approximate Equilibria Computation

## Two Types of Acceptable Approximation


- **Most literature algorithms are approximate**
  - Too many bits to even write down exact equilibria
- **These approximations will do nasty things!**
  - ❌ Mint money
  - ❌ Invalid trades
  - ❌ ...



# Approximate Equilibria Computation

## Two Types of Acceptable Approximation


- **Smooth limit price thresholds**
  - Reduces iterative oscillation
- **Trade partially if limit price is *close to* (and below) market rate**
  - Experiments use  $2^{-10} \approx 0.1\%$



# Approximate Equilibria Computation

## Two Types of Acceptable Approximation

- **Charge small, fixed fee**
  - Relaxes “market clearing” to allow surplus, not debt
  - Experiments use  $2^{-15} \approx 0.003\%$
- **Range of approximate clearing prices**
  - For computational efficiency, rather than for profit



# Accurate Equilibria Computation

- **Linear program turns prices into trades**
  - Efficient to solve (using market structure decomposition)
- **Guarantees approximations take acceptable forms**

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_{A,B} p_A x_{AB} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p_A L_{AB}\left(\frac{p_A}{p_B}\right) \leq p_A x_{AB} \leq p_A U_{AB}\left(\frac{p_A}{p_B}\right) \quad \forall A, B \\ & p_A \sum_{B \in [N]} x_{AB} \geq (1 - \text{fee}) \sum_{B \in [N]} p_B x_{BA} \quad \forall A \end{aligned}$$

# Accurate Equilibria Computation


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max Trade Volume

s.t. Correct (Smoothed) Offer Execution  
Assets Conserved (after fees)

# Overall Performance

- **48-CPU replicas**
- **Linear Scalability**
  - Contention with background work (logging)
- **Scalability enables adding features but maintaining throughput**
  - 50 assets, 10M accounts, Hashing, Logging,...
- **Log Dependence on #offers**



# Implementation

- **Self-contained SPEEDEX**

- <https://github.com/scslab/speedex>
- ~ 30,000 LOC C++

- **Prototyped in Stellar (Layer-1 Blockchain)**

- <https://github.com/gramseyer/stellar-core>
- Adds ~ 2000 LOC C++ to Stellar
- Commutative semantics, not parallel performance
- This is the only piece that needs a “hard fork”
  - ▷ Parallelization does not require coordinated upgrades





- **Is blockchain a good basis for an asset exchange?**
  - Not for traditional order matching
- **Yes, if you solve more problems at the same time**
  - Linear scalability via commutativity
  - Eliminate (a common type of) front-running, improve liquidity
- **Scalability can require letting go of traditional semantics, and this can be a good thing in many other ways!**
- **SPEEDEX handles more than 200,000 trades/second on 48-core commodity hardware, with 10s of millions of open offers**

Thank You!